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Introduction
The problem of perfectly secure message transmission is to ensure that the adversary cannot obtain information (in the information theoretic sense) about messages. Perfectly secure message transmission can perform reliable and secure communication, where it is assumed a sender S is connected to a receiver R in an unreliable network. S wishes to send a message m (chosen from a finite field F) reliably to R, and a guarantee is needed even when several kinds of network faults are present. Network faults are modeled in terms of an adversary with unbounded computing power who controls the actions of the network nodes. Note that if two parties S and R are connected by a private authenticated link, secure communication is guaranteed, however in most networks many parties are only indirectly connected. The interplay of network connectivity and secure communication has received much attention in the literature [4] [6][9] [11] . The motivation for tackling the problems of perfectly secure message transmission is that it is a fundamental primitive used by all fault-tolerant distributed algorithms such as Byzantine agreement [7] , multiparty computation etc. Existing faulttolerant distributed algorithms assume that the underlying network forms a complete graph. However, these studies dealt with wired networks and there are no results about perfectly secure message transmission on mobile networks, even though the latter are expected to play a major role in the evolution of next generation communication networks. There has been tremendous research interest in different areas of mobile technology including perfectly secure message transmission.
The problem of perfectly secure message transmission problem has previously been studied in various settings. For example, an underlying network model may be an undirected graph, directed graph or hypergraph, network communication can be synchronous or asynchronous [1] , faults can be Byzantine or passive etc. The number of faulty nodes may be bounded by a fixed constant or the potential sets of faulty nodes may be described by a collection of node subsets, while the adversary may be mobile or static. The parameters are the underlying network, the type of communication and the behavior of the adversary, and hundreds of different models/settings can be formulated using these
Related works
Dolev et al. [4] introduced and studied the problem of perfectly secure communication assuming that the adversary can corrupt up to t network players. If t players are active Byzantine failures, then a (2t+1)-connected network is necessary and sufficient. They abstracted the network in terms of channels and concentrated on solving the problem of perfectly secure message transmission for a single pair of processors, sender S and receiver R, connected by n parallel and synchronous bi-directed channels, viz., wired. Dolev et al. showed that the size of the network graph can be reduced by using a reliable and secure communication protocol. The interplay of network connectivity and secure communication has been studied extensively [3] [4]. Franklin and Yung [5] , Franklin and Wright [6] and Wang et al. [14] have studied secure communication and computation in multicast models. In a multicast channel, one party can send the same message to a fixed subset of players. Franklin and Yung [5] provided a necessary and sufficient condition for individuals to exchange private messages in multicast models with passive adversaries. There are many results about active adversaries [6] [14] . Srinathan et al. [10] proposed proactive perfect secure message transmission under a mobile adversary capable of moving from player to player. They showed that (2t+1)-connectivity is sufficient even in a proactive mobile setting where the adversary is allowed to corrupt different sets of t players in different rounds of the protocol. These protocols are implemented on wired networks but unfortunately, past works based on traditional communication networks are often not applicable to wireless networks. Thus in this paper we consider perfectly secure message transmission for mobile networks. Unlike wired networks, wireless mobile networks are not equipped with physical links and have mobility and some restrictions such as power consumption restrictions, moreover the location of the nodes may be random [13] . These factors are the reason models of traditional wired networks are not applicable to wireless mobile networks. So useful network graph models of wired networks [4] [6] [11] cannot be adopted. For the adoption of network graph, a mobile network must maintain the connection states. In mobile networks there are connection and disconnection state, while a connection state is reliably maintained in wired networks. The number of paths between nodes decides a connection state of a mobile network. Also, it decides the degree of the network. Xue et al. showed that in a network with n randomly placed nodes, when K=5.1774, each node should be connected to n K n log ) (log = Φ nearest neighbors for network connection [15] . So we assume an undirected graph with n nodes having n K log neighbors.
Network and Adversary Model
In this paper we consider a mobile network and a static adversary; herein, m denotes the message that S wishes to send to R. The message m is assumed to be a sequence of l elements from the finite Advances in Information Sciences and Service Sciences Volume 2, Number 2, June 2010
field F with l ≥ 1. The size of F is a function of δ, which is the error probability of the secure message transmission protocol.
Communication Graph
Consider a synchronous wireless mobile network M(P, E) represented by an undirected graph G where
denotes the set of players(nodes) in the network that are connected by 2-way wireless communication links defined by
. If two players, sender and receiver, are denoted by S and R respectively, then
. Assume that players S and R do not trust the network connection, nevertheless sender S wishes to securely send a message to receiver R through the wireless network. Security means that R receives exactly what S sent while the other players cannot obtain any information, even if up to t players (excluding S and R) collude and behave maliciously. This problem of perfectly secure message transmission was first proposed and solved by Dolev et al. [4] . In perfectly reliable message transmission, sender S can send a message to receiver R and it is received irrespective of the actions of the adversary. However the condition of message secrecy is removed. In the problem of perfectly secure message transmission, the adversary should not be able to obtain information (in the information theoretic sense) about m. Network faults are modeled in terms of an adversary with unbounded computing power who controls the actions of the network nodes. In this paper, distrust in the network is modeled in terms of a Byzantine adversary A, who can corrupt up to t players.
Xue et al. showed that in a network with n randomly placed nodes, each node should be connected to n K log nearest neighbors [15] . Thus we assume a mobile network for which all n nodes have n K log neighbors. In order to ensure that the degree of the graph is an integer, we use the   ⋅ function. In other words, the degree of each node is   n K log . Assume the degree of each node is the same. Sometimes, a directed graph is used for wireless networks in order to represent the mobility. But assuming each node has the same degree permits an undirected graph. If a k degree node moves to another location and its degree remains k, then the new graph is isomorphic to the original one. Since the mobility is not a factor, we can use an undirected graph for mobile networks. Xue et al. showed that in a network with n randomly placed nodes, each node should be connected to n K n log ) (log = Φ nearest neighbors [15] . If each node is connected to more than 5.1774log n nearest neighbors, then the network is asymptotically connected with a probability approaching one. Let N(n,ø n ) denote the network formed when each node is connected to its ø n nearest neighbors.
Theorem
1 [15] . For N(n,ø n ) (log n Φ ) to be asymptotically connected, neighbors are necessary and sufficient. Specially, there are two constants 0<c 1 <c 2 such that : Sun-Young Lee wireless network is considered to be disconnected asymptotically with probability one. We use the   ⋅ function to ensure that the degree of the node is an integer. Since the degree of the node is   n K log , the number of paths of G, N, is   n K n log . □ If a node has less than   n K log nearest neighbors because of factors such as lack of power, the wireless network is considered to be disconnected and our protocol is terminated. If the disconnected node is one of the corrupted nodes, the adversary's attack fails and a new set must be constructed for the corrupted nodes.
Adversary
Let A static be a threshold for a static adversary acting on a network G that can corrupt up to t players.
corrupts a set of nodes in G and has unbounded computing power. Assume an adversary with only Byzantine corruption [8] .
Definition 1. Byzantine Corruption A node P i is said to be Byzantine corrupted if the adversary fully controls the actions of P i . The adversary will have full access to the computation and communication of P i and can force P i to deviate from the protocol and behave arbitrarily.
We assume that the adversary is centralized and can collectively pool data from the nodes under its control for arbitrary purposes. The total number of nodes that can be controlled by the adversary throughout the protocol is bounded by a threshold. Prior to execution of the protocol, it is not known what the adversary will influence or what paths will be corrupted. The adversary can view all of the behaviors of the corrupted nodes and control the messages. When the adversary corrupts t nodes, he can control
paths, which is proved by Lemma 1. Once a node is under the control of the adversary it will remain corrupted throughout the protocol.
Perfectly Reliable and Secure Message Transmission Protocol
In this section, we show that the protocol for perfectly secure message transmission proposed in [11] can be modified for mobile networks. Let us assume that message m is an element of a sufficiently large field F. Each internal node sends the message to   n K log nearest neighbors. Some nodes might receive the same messages from other neighbors. In our protocol, nodes receive only the first message as message m. We describe a reliable message transmission protocol as follows:
Reliable Message Transmission of m -Sender S sends message m along all paths Γ i
along path Γ i forward the message to the next player along Γ i -The receiver R receives the values along all paths and takes the majority value as the message m.
. If the underlying graph G itself is a collection of disjoint paths from S to R, then the protocol is optimal. Now we present the 2-phase protocol. Since no single phase protocol can exist [4] , the proposed protocol has the optimal number of phases. We show the protocol execution on G. A player can send messages to his neighbors and in one phase sender S can send a message to receiver R or vice-versa. Proof : The adversary cannot obtain any information about p i for each honest path Γ i in phase I, because p i is a random polynomial of degree T and the adversary has seen only T points. Furthermore, the adversary cannot obtain any new information in Phase II, as explained by the following:
Phase I.
-Each node on G checks its degree. If the degree is not equal to   n K log , the protocol is terminated. . Since path Γ i is faulty, this information is already known to the adversary, who only knows at most T coefficients of the polynomial Q, and hence cannot obtain any information about the message. □ Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 shows the respective number of minimum paths for t-corrupted nodes and the connectivity for perfectly secure message transmission on a mobile network. Proof : In a wireless network with n nodes, each node should have   n K log paths on the network graph. Firstly, t nodes should be connected and these can be corrupted. For the connection of t nodes, 
Proof :
We can prove the theorem in the manner given in [3] when N>T and N ≥ 2T+1. A reliable sender sends 2T+1 copies of a message. Because at most T faults are present, at most T messages can be lost. This implies that the number of copies is at least T+1 and at least T+1 of the received messages are reliably transmitted. If T ≥ N, then it is not possible to achieve secure message transmission, since an adversary can place one fault on each path and either block or monitor all communication between S and R. Therefore we assume N>T. □ Theorem 5 shows that mobile networks require more connectivity than wired networks.
Theorem 5.
More connectivity (2T+1) is needed for perfectly secure message transmission on mobile networks than for wired networks (2t+1).
Proof : Assuming t-corrupted nodes, the connectivity of a wired network for perfectly secure message transmission is (2t+1). 
Conclusions
We have proposed a perfectly secure message transmission protocol for mobile networks under an undirected graph G and a Byzantine adversary. We considered that network connection is the most important factor for mobile networks, and proved that a mobile network with n nodes should have   n K n N log = paths for network connection, assuming K=5.1774. And, t corrupted nodes, which form a subgraph of G, should be connected with   t K t T log = paths when there is Byzantine corruption. While (2t+1)-connectivity is sufficient for wired networks, we showed that wireless networks require (2T+1)-connectivity for perfectly secure message transmission, implying that perfectly secure message transmission on wireless networks requires more paths than wired networks.
